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PERMISSIBLE NEGLIGENCE AND
CAMPAIGNS TO SUPPRESS RIGHTS
Glenn Harlan Reynolds*
Professor Andrew McClurg has written interestingly about what he
calls the “Second Amendment right to be negligent,” under which, he
says, gun owners, sellers, and manufacturers escape liability for guns
that, through theft and other means, fall into the hands of criminals,
chiefly thanks to a federal statute, the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act.1 In passing, Professor McClurg notes that only one other
item in the Bill of Rights, press freedom under the Supreme Court’s
decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,2 enjoys a similar “right to be
negligent.”3 He is right that other Bill of Rights provisions enjoy no
such additional protection (though one might argue that under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments the government enjoys a “right to be
negligent” via the doctrine of good-faith immunity).
But Professor McClurg’s article understandably does not digress into
the interesting question of why, exactly, the First and Second
Amendments provide protection against tort claims in a way that other
constitutional rights have not. In this brief response, I will look at that
question, and will also touch, briefly, on the to-me interesting aspect
that the protection enjoyed by publishers under the First Amendment
was created by judicial action, while that enjoyed under the Second
Amendment was instead the product of legislation. But, in short, the
common explanation for these “rights to be negligent” lies in the fact
that both First and Second Amendment rights were, at different times,
targeted by litigation campaigns involving cooperation (“collusion”
might be too pejorative a word) between private litigants and
government actors, where the litigation was focused more on limiting
the extent of the rights than on compensating discrete injuries. I will
also touch upon the separation-of-powers argument for statutory rights
to be negligent in, at least, the Second Amendment context.
NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Most readers, of course, will know that the Sullivan opinion grew
out of a campaign by Southern interests to limit and punish negative
reporting on racial issues by Northern newspapers.4 Subject to trial
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before juries (and often judges) hostile to racial integration, these
Northern newspapers risked substantial losses if their reporting
offended interests in the South.5 The Montgomery-based suit against the
New York Times that gave rise to the Sullivan decision is just one such.
The Court recognized this reality. In his Sullivan concurrence,
Justice Hugo Black called these libel suits a “technique for harassing
and punishing a free press.”6 Justice Black explained:
There is no reason to believe that there are not more such
huge verdicts lurking just around the corner for the Times
or any other newspaper or broadcaster which might dare to
criticize public officials. In fact, briefs before us show that
in Alabama there are now pending eleven libel suits by
local and state officials against the Times seeking
$5,600,000, and five such suits against the Columbia
Broadcasting System seeking $1,700,000. Moreover, this
technique for harassing and punishing a free press . . . can
be used in other fields where public feelings may make
local as well as out-of-state newspapers easy prey for libel
verdict seekers.7
By 1964, when the Sullivan case came before the Supreme Court,
“government officials had filed at least $300 million in libel actions
against newspapers, news magazines, television networks and civil
rights leaders.”8
These lawsuits were intended to chill or banish negative coverage.
As Anthony Lewis wrote, the libel campaign was a “state political
weapon to intimidate the press. The aim was to discourage not false but
true accounts of life under a system of white supremacy . . . . It was to
scare the national press—newspapers, magazines, the television
networks—off the civil rights story.”9 A private communication
between Birmingham Commissioner J.T. Waggoner, a plaintiff in
another libel suit, and his attorney, James A. Simpson, “casts some

50 Years Later, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/03/05/thelandmark-libel-case-times-v-sullivan-still-resonates-50-years-later/#5ed2578c7eb7 (noting that
the case “emerged from the battles of the 1950s and 60s” and the advertorial at issue in the case
“highlight[ed] crimes and harassment perpetrated by, or with support or tacit approval of, some
government officials against blacks and civil rights leaders in the segregated south”).
5. See id. (stating that Sullivan won a jury trial, earning $500,000.00 in damages).
6. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 295 (Black, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 294–95.
8. Aimee Edmondson, In Sullivan’s Shadow: The Use and Abuse of Libel Law During
the Civil Rights Movement 43–44 (Dec. 2008) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri)
(citing HARRISON E. SALISBURY, WITHOUT FEAR OR Favor 388 (1982)).
9. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 35
(2d ed. 1992).
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doubt on whether Waggoner felt defamed personally.”10 Reportedly,
Simpson advised Waggoner the suit would dissuade newspapers like the
Times “from committing ruthless attacks on [their] region and its
people.”11 Furthermore, Simpson stated he was positive that this
deterrence was the chief reason Waggoner had determined to engage in
tumultuous litigation.12
Until the Sullivan opinion was handed down, the deterrence worked.
As Harrison Salisbury wrote, news media outlets had to “think twice
about reporting the facts, harsh and raw as they often were.”13 The
Montgomery Advertiser called the libel suits a “formidable club to
swing at out-of-state press,”14 and observed that “the recent
checkmating of the Times in Alabama will impose a restraint on other
publications.”15 Lawyers for the Times even encouraged reporters to
avoid Alabama, to avoid creating more libel suits or running the risk of
being served with a subpoena.16 Stories were even killed for fear of
lawsuits:
On the advice of their lawyers, Times editors killed a
Sunday story Sitton wrote in late 1962 about a change in
the Birmingham city government that might “depose
Commissioner Eugene (Bull) Connor, whom Negroes
regard as one of the South’s toughest police bosses.” Times
lawyer Tom Daly advised editors that the story “might
indicate malice” in the pending Sullivan suit before the
Supreme Court. It did indeed appear that “public officials
had achieved their objective. Jim Crow could return to its
good old days, operating with virtually no scrutiny.”17
Set against this background of a concerted effort to burden or impair
First Amendment rights through strategic litigation—litigation aimed
not at compensating a discrete injury, but at affecting the behavior of
the news industry—the Supreme Court created what Professor McClurg
calls a “right to be negligent,” by limiting libel claims against public
officials and public figures to cases where the plaintiff could show
“actual malice.”18 Otherwise, the Court concluded, the tort system
might be used by powerful interests to undermine an important part of
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Edmondson, supra note 8, at 50.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
SALISBURY, supra note 8, at 384.
Edmondson, supra note 8, at 52 (quoting Grover Hall, Checkmate, MONTGOMERY
ADVERTISER, May 22, 1960, at 15).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
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the Bill of Rights.19
THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S RIGHT TO BE NEGLIGENT
Professor McClurg’s analysis of “rights to be negligent” in the
context of the Second Amendment is the main focus of his article, of
course, and he roots these rights in the Protection of Lawful Commerce
in Arms Act,20 and the Child Safety Lock Act of 2005.21 These acts
were passed in response to what might fairly be called an effort by
powerful interests to use the tort system to undermine an important part
of the Bill of Rights.
As David Kopel and Richard Gardner write, in an article that
explicitly makes the Sullivan analogy:
In the last [four] decades, groups or attorneys opposed to
widespread citizen ownership of firearms (or certain types
of firearms) have brought a vast number of product liability
suits against gun companies and gun retailers. Often the
avowed purpose of that litigation was to make the
manufacture and sale of firearms so costly that the industry
would give up.22
They continue:
The hypothetical situation described for free speech in
Alabama in the 1960s is where we [were] in the argument
for the right to arms in the 1990s. Ever since the early
1980s, product liability suits against gun manufacturers
have been solicited and orchestrated by the legal arms of
anti-gun organizations . . . . [T]he legal assault on the
exercise of Second Amendment rights . . . is far more
consciously developed and carefully planned than the
assault on First Amendment rights was in the 1960s.23
And, as with the Civil Rights Era libel suits, it was a case of what
might be termed a public-private partnership: “The gun suits are, after
all, public policy litigation at heart; the key plaintiffs in the recent wave
of litigation were not individuals or class representatives but
government entities seeking regulatory reform through injunctive relief

19. Id. at 292.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2012).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 922(z)(l) (2012).
22. David B. Kopel & Richard E. Gardner, The Sullivan Principles: Protecting the Second
Amendment from Civil Abuse, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 737, 749–50 (1995) (internal citations
omitted).
23. Id. at 772.
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and the threat of damages.”24
But, as with the earlier public policy lawsuits against the tobacco
industry, these suits were filed by private attorneys.25 The filing of
many of these suits was a project of the Castano Group, originally
named for a man who died of lung cancer,26 and whose death provided
the impetus for a mass tort campaign against tobacco companies.27 As
the prospects for nationwide tobacco litigation faded, the emphasis
shifted to guns.28 Castano gave rise to the Castano Safe Gun Litigation
Group, which filed gun lawsuits on behalf of the cities of Atlanta,
Cleveland, Cincinnati, Newark, and Wilmington.29 As in the organized
Civil Rights Era libel suits, mayors and other public officials were
central figures in the suits.30
In the libel suits, pro-segregation officials waged a sort of
asymmetric warfare. They were weak in the news media sphere, but
strong in local courts, allowing them to use local litigation to weaken
national media. In the gun rights suits, it was a different sort of
asymmetric warfare, using the courts to offset legislative weakness:
For many big city mayors and gun control advocates, filing
lawsuits against the firearms industry represents a way to
pursue gun control policies that they have failed to achieve
through the political process. . . . So they have turned to the
courts, asking judges to impose gun controls that they
believe would otherwise be passed by an uncorrupted
legislative process.31
Or as one attorney put it plainly: “You don’t need a legislative
majority to file a lawsuit.”32
Congress’ response paralleled that of the Supreme Court in Sullivan.
Faced with what it saw as an abuse of the tort system to limit the scope
of a constitutional right, Congress passed laws limiting the ability of
plaintiffs to file such suits. As Professor McClurg notes, the Protection
of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act provides extensive tort immunity to
24. Howard M. Erichson, Private Lawyers, Public Lawsuits: Plaintiffs’ Attorneys in
Municipal Gun Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN
CONTROL AND MASS TORTS 129, 130 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., The U. of Mich. Press 2005).
25. See id. at 129–30.
26. See id. at 129.
27. See id. at 136.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 129.
30. See id. at 139.
31. Timothy D. Lytton, The NRA, the Brady Campaign, and the Politics of Gun
Litigation, in SUING THE GUN INDUSTRY: A BATTLE AT THE CROSSROADS OF GUN CONTROL AND
MASS TORTS 152, 152 (Timothy D. Lytton ed., The U. of Mich. Press 2005).
32. Id. at 154.
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gun manufacturers and gun dealers in both state and federal court.33 The
Child Safety Lock Act limits liability of individuals for negligence in
securing firearms.34 Similar to the effect of Sullivan on the libel
campaign, this legislation largely ended the anti-gun tort litigation
campaign. In doing so, as Professor McClurg notes, Congress
specifically noted that the Second Amendment is involved.35
CONCLUSION
The parallels between the Supreme Court’s treatment of libel suits
being used as political weapons and Congress’ treatment of gun-based
tort actions being used in the same way are pretty substantial. But that
leaves us with two questions. First, why such protection for these two
rights, press freedom and the right to arms? And second, why is one
such protection offered by the Court, and the other by Congress?
With regard to the first question, one possible answer is that, as
Kopel and Gardner note, only the first three amendments in the Bill of
Rights offer substantive, as opposed to procedural, protections.36 Given
the general lack of interest in the Third Amendment, this may be taken
as evidence that a “right to be negligent” is a normal accompaniment of
substantive protections under the Bill of Rights. Perhaps it’s even
possible that, should people’s right not to quarter troops in their homes
except in wartime under congressional direction be threatened by mass
litigation, either the Court or Congress would step in. But I wouldn’t
hold my breath on that one materializing.37
It may also tell us something regarding views, both judicial and
legislative, about appropriate limits to the tort system. While tort
litigation may, naturally enough, bring about large-scale changes over
time, use of the tort system to wage battles that are fundamentally
political and not about remedying discrete injuries may seem excessive,
at least where such uses threaten to limit substantive constitutional
rights. Where that happens, special legal protections—Professor
McClurg’s “right to be negligent”—are necessary to put an end to it.
Which raises a final question: If the “right to be negligent” is a sort
of penumbral aspect of First and Second Amendment rights, why is it
33. See McClurg, supra note 1, at 5.
34. See id.
35. See id. at 8.
36. Kopel & Gardner, supra note 22, at 743 (“[O]f the entire Bill of Rights, only the First,
Second, and Third Amendments guarantee particular substantive rights. Amendments Four
through Eight are due process requirements for the government to obey, while Amendments
Nine and Ten are non-specific reservations of rights.”) (internal citations omitted).
37. See generally Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Third Amendment Penumbras: Some
Preliminary Observations, 82 TENN. L. REV. 557 (2015) (discussing possible penumbras, if any,
of the Third Amendment); Symposium, Exploring The Forgotten Third Amendment, 82 TENN.
L. REV. 491 (2015).

2016]

PERMISSIBLE NEGLIGENCE AND CAMPAIGNS TO SUPPRESS RIGHTS

57

enforced in the one case by the Supreme Court and in the other by
Congress? There are a couple of possible explanations here, too. The
first is simply timing. The Supreme Court decided Sullivan because the
case got there in the normal course of litigation and the First
Amendment right to a free press was already well-established. When
Congress passed its own “right to be negligent” statutes, on the other
hand, the Supreme Court had not yet decided District of Columbia v.
Heller,38 leaving the extent (or even existence) of Second Amendment
protections in the judicial branch unclear. Thus it fell to Congress, in
this case, to offer Second Amendment protections.
The other possible explanation is a bit more troubling. One might
argue that the difference here is evidence of a class divide. It’s not hard
for the justices of the Supreme Court to identify with the legal plight of
Timesmen faced with abusive libel suits. The judiciary is, naturally
enough, the most academic branch of government, and, being made up
entirely of attorneys, the one most likely to be sympathetic to the
problems of the chattering upper-middle classes. Congress, on the other
hand, is likely to be more sympathetic to the large number of less-elite
Americans who hunt and shoot—and, perhaps, less sympathetic to
litigation efforts explicitly aimed at bypassing the normal
political/legislative process.
In a sense, Congress was defending not only the Second Amendment
rights of Americans here, but also standing up for itself in terms of
separation of powers, by keeping legislative powers within the
legislative sphere. While judicial decisions, by their nature, can have
regulatory effects in a common law system, a public-private litigation
partnership aimed at end-running legislative majorities is something
different, and a threat to the role of the legislature itself. As such, it
should not be surprising that the legislature might take steps to defend
its role against encroachment.
Which one of these explanations, if either, is correct is beyond the
scope of this brief response. But looking at the First Amendment and
Second Amendment varieties of “permissible negligence,” and how
they arrived, leaves me feeling more sanguine about both than Professor
McClurg seems to be. There are, of course, costs involved in protecting
constitutional rights. Protections for criminal defendants mean that
some guilty parties go free, but we accept those as the price of living in
a free country. Protections for media statements about public figures
mean that some libel goes unpunished. Barriers to weaponized tort
litigation mean that some incentives for safety are taken off the table.
These are (a few of) the constitutional tradeoffs we make. Whether
they are worth making is open for debate, and there are strong voices to
38. 544 U.S. 570 (2008).

58

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 68

be found in favor of, or against, all of them.
The tragedy of life, my father used to say, is that not all values can
be realized. Certainly not simultaneously. In these “right to be
negligent” cases, both the Supreme Court and Congress have chosen the
Constitution over competing values. Given that their oaths are,
primarily, to the Constitution, that seems fitting enough.

